We are Ukraine (Part II): The Ethics of Military Intervention Against Russia

Ми Україна.

An Opinion Piece by Darren M. Slade, PhD

I don't know all of the intricacies, complexities, and nuances of NATO, but I am interested to know how much of the current Ukrainian bloodshed could have been prevented. It sounds like Ukraine was serious about seeking NATO membership starting in 2019, and it seems fairly certain that Russia would not have invaded Ukraine had it been a NATO member. Could NATO have stopped all of this long ago by accepting Ukraine into the European fold?

This then makes me wonder: What if NATO gave Ukraine emergency acceptance into the Alliance and then gave Russia 48 hours to leave Ukraine before NATO activated Article 5 ("Collective Defense") of Ukraine's new membership? Would that put the necessary pressure on Putin to withdraw all of his military forces immediately?

Of course, I don't know anything about foreign policy or international relations, so these initial ideas might be completely wrongheaded. But what I do know is the philosophical study of ethics, and perhaps a discussion on the morality of intervention can help us determine whether NATO or any other country ought to intervene militarily against Russia.

Sufficient Conditions for Intervention (SCI)

In my most recent publication entitled, "Failed to Death," I discuss the notion that "certain ethical agents" have a moral obligation to intervene on behalf of vulnerable people. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, those “certain ethical agents” are anyone (namely the United States and NATO) who possess the Sufficient Conditions for Intervention (SCI): knowledge, authority, means, safety, and opportunity. Any SCI country ought to intervene (directly or indirectly) in order to stop innocent civilians from being killed from an unprovoked military invasion.

It is important to highlight that these conditions are sufficient criteria to obligate intervention, meaning they are not the minimal conditions necessary to create a moral duty to intercede. They are neither exhaustive nor necessary for every situation. Countries could possess only some of these conditions and still have, depending on legal or other considerations, a moral obligation to intervene on behalf of another country.

The first condition of knowledge is self-explanatory, though it signifies two principles equally: an awareness of the victim’s situation and the practical know-how for attempting intervention. The next condition of authority represents a country's legal right to enforce international laws, although this condition is not morally necessary for intervention because non-legally obligated countries could still intercede on behalf of others. However, any ethical country who does have the legal authority to intervene is doubly obligated to do so because of their unique position of power (cf. Prov. 3:27–28).

Like knowledge, countries should also possess the means to intercede, such as the necessary military resources and personnel. It is unreasonable to expect a country with no military to enter a military conflict. Moreover, the condition of safety is a catch-all designation for multiple “equivalent need” limitations. For instance, individual persons are not obligated to intervene if it would put their safety at risk or if providing intervention would place them in equivalent or worse need of help. Additionally, individual persons are not obligated if intervention would sacrifice something of comparable moral importance, such as the health and safety of another individual. The question is: do these same limitations apply to nation-states? Finally, the condition of opportunity represents circumstances that make it possible to intervene. Hence, it is unreasonable to expect countries to intervene if a natural disaster is preventing them from moving their military personnel across the globe.

Implied here is that if a country does posses these Sufficient Conditions for Intervention, then they are morally obligated to intervene. In deciding whether the United States or NATO has the moral necessity to intervene militarily, we must first assess whether these conditions have been met satisfactorily.

Moral Necessity of Intervention

I would argue that there exists certain situations that demand an intervention by any agent available because of a prerequisite belief in the sanctity and quality of life. This prerequisite principle is the empirical basis for every ethical system today, concluding that human lives are inherently valuable and warrant protection as an end unto itself. Indeed, agents cannot act morally toward a dead person, making the intrinsic value of life a precondition for its own sake.

Significantly, this argument does not insist that countries should intervene in every human rights violation, social injustice, or instance of extreme suffering, but it does argue that countries are morally obligated to intervene in extreme circumstances. This insistence is because some cases are of such an acute degree above routine human misery that the shocking display of cruelty meted out on innocent persons demands an immediate intervention by any SCI country available. Nonintervention is simply not an option because the need is far too great. If an ethical country can help these vulnerable people, then that agent has a responsibility to do so unless demonstratable evidence shows that such help would result in morally worse conditions.

One reason why ethical agents have a moral obligation to intervene is because, for example, Ukrainian kids are paradigmatic examples of vulnerability and innocence. As young children, they are incapable of defending themselves or caring for their own needs. They are dependent on others and have a reasonable expectation that people would provide for their care. Likewise, the children are innocent because they did not warrant such aggression; they're neither causally nor morally deserving of being killed in military conflict. When considering the prerequisite sanctity (or quality) of life in conjunction with the seriousness of the potential death tolls from war, I would argue that an SCI country is, in fact, morally obligated to intervene to stop innocent and vulnerable children from being bombed to death.

Prima facie Duty of Beneficence

In essence, what is being argued here is that there exists a prima facie obligation to protect vulnerable civilians from unprovoked military strikes. Other things being equal, people have a “prima facie duty of beneficence” where ethical countries are obligated to save human life from extreme circumstances whenever and wherever possible. Naturally, multiple prima facie duties may occur simultaneously and conflict with each other. In that case, the weightier prima facie obligation will determine a country's duty proper. If there is a conflict, then ethical countries are obligated to choose the higher moral law, which is likely whatever action preserves the most amount of innocent human life. In our current situation, there is a case to be made that there is no weightier prima facie duty than to intervene and help those vulnerable Ukrainian children.

This duty of beneficence also conforms to “the social conferral of rights” criterion. Here, what is considered immoral becomes a fixed principle according to what would be preferred by impartial countries who have no personal gain in the outcome of the moral decision. The criterion asks, What would unbiased countries determine as the right course of action if they themselves did not know whether they would profit or suffer from the decision? I believe this social conferral of rights would determine that an SCI country has the prima facie duty to stop the unjust killing of innocent civilians.

From an ethical naturalist perspective, intervening to save vulnerable Ukrainian children is a principle that 1) most people would support; 2) objective observers would endorse; 3) most people would desire; 4) is what (potentially) maximizes global human happiness and stability; and 5) is what furthers human health and wellbeing globally. Conversely, from an ethical nonnaturalist perspective, intervening to save vulnerable children is a self-explanatory property of an objective moral fact. "It’s wrong to kill innocent children," the argument would go, "and we plainly recognize the need to stop it.”

The dilemma is in understanding whether more human misery and more innocent lives lost would result from such military intervention. So next, we will examine the ethics of nonintervention.

**To be Continued** Part III: The Ethics of Nonintervention

Biblical Patriotism: An Evangelical Alternative to Nationalism

Buy Now

God and Horrendous Suffering

Buy Now